

# Chapter 8

## Epistemic uses of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* in La Paz Spanish

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This paper explores epistemic-evidential uses of the pluperfect, i.e. *pretérito pluscuamperfecto*, in La Paz Spanish. The *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* displays functions of a reported evidential form, conforming to results from previous studies on Argentinian Spanish (Bermúdez 2008; Speranza 2014) and, furthermore, is used according to a previously unnoticed inferential evidential function. Using theoretical frameworks from Kockelman (1957) and Bergqvist (2018), this paper describes the configuration of participant roles and event types implied in the different evidential functions of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto*.

### 1 Introduction

Romance languages do not possess grammaticalised evidentials and express the evidential domain through verbal inflection. In peninsular Spanish, for instance, the evidential domain is expressed by means of the simple future, the past imperfect, the present conditional and the past conditional. The simple future and the present conditional are used to express inference in the present (1) and in the past (2), respectively.

- (1) Peninsular Spanish (Squartini 2001: 317; gloss added)

Ahora *serán* las cuatro.

now be.FUT.3PL ART.F.PL four

‘It must be (lit. will be) 4 o’clock.’



- (2) Peninsular Spanish (Squartini 2001: 317; gloss added, translation modified)  
*Serían las ocho cuando salimos.*  
 be.CON.3PL ART.F.PL eight when go.out-PST.1PL  
 ‘It was (lit. would be) 8 o’clock when we left.’

Whereas the imperfect (3) and the past conditional<sup>1</sup> (4) are used to express reported evidentiality.

- (3) Peninsular Spanish (Reyes 1996: 31; gloss added, translation added)
- a. *¿Qué tal sigue Ana?*  
 how follow-textscprs.3sg PN  
 ‘How is Ana doing?’
- b. *Mejor me parece. No la v-i, porque cuando llegué dorm-ía. Pero hab-ía com-ido algo, y tenía menos fiebre. Esta noche la veía el médico de nuevo.*  
 better 1SG.DAT seem-PRS.3SG not 3SG.F.ACC see-PST.1SG because  
 when arrive-PST.1SG sleep-PST.IPFV.3SG but have-PST.IPFV.3SG  
 eat-PTCP something and have-PST.IPFV.3SG less fever this night  
 the doctor again  
 ‘I think she’s better. I did not see her, because when I arrived, she was sleeping. But she had eaten something and had lower fever. Tonight, the doctor is supposedly going to see (lit. saw) her again.’
- (4) Peninsular Spanish (Squartini 2001: 317; gloss added, translation modified)  
*Según fuente-s políticas consult-ad-as por este periódico,*  
 according.to source-PL politic-PL.F consult-PTCP-PL.F by this newspaper  
*Milosevic hab-ría aceptado que la*  
 NP have-COND.3SG accept-PTCP that ART.F.SG  
*fuerza de interposición en Kosovo est-é compue-sta por un 30% de*  
 peacekeeping.force in Kosovo be-SUBJ.1SG form-PTCP.F by ART of  
*efectivo-s de la OTAN.*  
 troop-PL of ART.F.SG NATO  
 ‘According to political sources consulted by this newspaper, Milosevic accepted (lit. would have accepted) the Kosovo peacekeeping force to be composed of 30% NATO troops.’

<sup>1</sup>The evidential use of the past conditional is restricted to journalistic or more formal prose (Reyes 1996: 33).

With regard to the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto*, Spanish grammars (Hernández Alonso 1986, Cartagena 1999) describe it as the tense that points out the *consecutio temporum* ‘sequence of tenses’ between two past actions: the more recent action is conjugated in imperfect, simple past or present perfect, while the preceding action is in *pretérito pluscuamperfecto*.

- (5) Peninsular Spanish (10\_SP\_TASK: 10)  
*luego mi la mi mujer fue a vend-er lo que*  
 then my ART.F.SG my woman go.PST.3SG to sell-INF 3SG.ACC that  
*hab-ía cosech-ado y yo me fui a sent-ar*  
 have-IPFV.3SG harvest-PTCP and I 1.REFL go.PST.1SG to sit-INF  
 ‘Then my wife went to sell what she had harvested and I went to sit.’

Moreover, the *Nueva Gramática de la Lengua Española* (Española 2010: 542) indicates two other uses of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto*, such as the expression of habitual actions (6) and politeness (7).

- (6) Peninsular Spanish (RAE 2010: 452; gloss added, translation added)  
*A esa hora, los viernes Eugenio hab-ía sal-ido del*  
 at that hour the friday NP have-IPFV.3SG go.out-PTCP from.ART.SG  
*trabajo.*  
 work  
 ‘At that time, every Friday, Eugenio went (lit. had gone) out from work.’

- (7) Peninsular Spanish (Hernández Alonso 1986: 355; gloss added, translation added)  
*Hab-ía pens-ado yo ped-ir-le.*  
 have-IPFV.3SG go.out-PTCP I ask-INF-3SG.DAT  
 ‘I was thinking (lit. had thought) to ask him/her.’

In addition to these normative uses, studies on Latin American Spanish varieties (Laprade 1981; Mendoza 1991; Callisaya Apaza 2012; Adelaar & Muysken 2004; Speranza 2014; Bermúdez 2008) have also attested evidential uses of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* (8).

- (8) La Paz Spanish (Laprade 1981: 224; gloss added, translation modified)  
*Me hab-ía tra-ído est-a puntabola.*  
 1.REFL have-IPFV.3SG bring-PTCP this-F pen  
 ‘I (accidentally) brought (lit. had brought) this pen with me.’

The specialized literature on the evidential use of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* in Argentinian Spanish is limited to two studies, i.e. Bermúdez (2008) and Speranza (2014). While questioning the temporal function of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto*, Bermúdez (2008) shows four evidential functions of this tense: an ‘external source’, which expresses the perspective of a third party; ‘shared access to information’, marking information also known by the addressee; ‘endophoric source’, marking information that does not come from sensory experience; and finally, ‘mirative’, which marks information that goes against speaker’s expectations. Speranza (2014), in turn, proposes a sociolinguistic analysis of the uses of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* and observes a higher number of epistemic-evidential uses in the varieties of Argentinian Spanish that are in contact with languages with grammaticalised evidential-epistemic systems, such as Quechua and Guaraní (Speranza 2014: 26). With respect to the expression of the commitment to the truth of information provided by the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* as evidential-epistemic form, Bermúdez (2008) and Speranza (2014) arrive at different conclusions. Bermúdez (2008: 217) states that the use of an indirect evidential does not necessarily imply a low commitment to the truth of information:

Assigning information to an external source may mean either a weakening, or a strengthening of the reliability of the utterance, this depends on the level of reliability given to the source by the participants involved in the language exchange.<sup>2</sup>

Whereas Speranza (2014: 111) states more precisely that the use of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* implies the speaker’s low degree of commitment to the truth of the information provided.

The appearance of the PPl (*pretérito pluscuamperfecto*) is related to utterances where there is the possibility of greater ambiguity in the attribution of what is mentioned [...] the sender, then, expresses a lower degree of reliability by selecting a subordinate tense.<sup>3</sup>

I am not aware of a separate study focusing on the epistemic-evidential function of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* in Bolivian and Peruvian Spanish, even

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<sup>2</sup>El asignar una información a una fuente externa puede significar tanto una debilitación como un fortalecimiento de la credibilidad de la afirmación, lo cual depende del nivel de credibilidad concedido a la fuente en cuestión por los participantes del intercambio lingüístico.

<sup>3</sup>La aparición del PPl se vincula a emisiones en las que existe la posibilidad de mayor ambigüedad en la atribución de los dichos [...] El enunciador, entonces, expresa su menor grado de confiabilidad a través de la selección del tiempo verbal dependiente.

though this use has been noted in the literature (Laprade 1981: 222–225; Mendoza 1991: 196–203; Callisaya Apaza 2012: 306–308; Adelaar & Muysken 2004). Laprade (1981: 223) notices that in La Paz Spanish the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* can have mirative function or indicate absence of direct knowledge. Along this line, Mendoza (1991: 199) adds a further observation based on phonology, arguing that whenever the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* has evidential-epistemic function in La Paz Spanish, the auxiliary verb *haber* ‘to have’ shows an accent shifting from *había* to *habíá*. Finally, Callisaya Apaza (2012: 307) states that epistemic-evidential uses of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* are also found in other regions of Bolivia, although the author does not specify which ones. The contributions of the present study are three-fold. First, it details the epistemic-evidential uses of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* in La Paz Spanish. As already mentioned, the use of the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* as an indirect evidential form has been already described for Argentinian Spanish (Speranza 2014; Bermúdez 2008), but its use in other varieties of Latin American Spanish and, specifically, in Bolivian Spanish has not been accounted for. The second contribution consists of further data that highlights the pragmatic functions of the form in interaction. It is argued that, in its evidential function, the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* signals the distancing of the speaker from the propositional content of the utterance. Such a distancing, however, is not necessarily related to a low degree of commitment to the truth of the information and, in this regard, the evidential uses of this tense, i.e. inferential or reported, display different outcomes. The third contribution is to give better insights on the configuration of the pragmatic features involved in the use of *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* as evidential form. Following the theoretical framework proposed by Kockelman (1957) and Bergqvist (2018), the pragmatic features – such as event types and participant roles – involved in the different evidential functions of the form as well as their distribution are discussed. The first-hand data used in the study were collected in La Paz, Bolivia during 2014 and 2015.

In the remainder of the paper, I will refer to the *pretérito pluscuamperfecto* by the acronym PPI (cf. Speranza 2014)<sup>4</sup>.

## 2 Evidentials, epistemic modality, participant roles and event types

Aikhenvald (2004: 3) argues that the core meaning of evidentiality is the expression of the source of information, but she notes epistemic extensions for both

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<sup>4</sup>This paper is based on chapter 10 of my PhD thesis (Quartararo 2017).

reported (Aikhenvald 2004: 180) and inferential evidential markers (Aikhenvald 2004: 176). Such extensions are usually related to the expression of the speaker's degree of commitment to the truth of the information, i.e. epistemic modality, and are attested in languages in which the two domains, i.e. evidentiality and epistemic modality, are expressed by the same forms (Plungian 2001: 354, cf. Romance languages). The overlap between the two domains is visible in how indirect evidentials may indicate both the speaker's direct contact with the results of an event, and the lack of such results. This is the case of inferring evidentiality<sup>5</sup> (Willett 1988: 57), as in the use of the Italian future tense in (9), and reported evidentiality (Willett 1988: 57), as in the use of the Italian conditional mood in (10). In both cases, the speaker may express different degrees of reliability regarding the verisimilitude of the state of affairs due to the lack of direct evidence.

- (9) Italian (Squartini 2008: 923; gloss added, translation modified)

[*Suon-ano alla porta*]. *Sarà il postino*.  
 ring-PRS.3PL to.ART.SG door be.FUT.3SG the postman  
 '[The bell rings] It must be (lit. will be) the postman.'

- (10) Italian (Squartini 2001: 311; gloss added)

*Secondo Luca, ieri il treno sarebbe part-ito alle*  
 according.to PN yesterday the train be.COND.3SG leave-PTCP to.ART.PL  
 5.  
 5  
 'According to Luca the train left (lit. would have left) at 5 yesterday.'

In recent years, some studies on the pragmatic properties of evidentials (Curnow 2002, 2003; Clift 2006; Faller 2006; Hengeveld & Hattner 2015) have significantly contributed to the description of semantic extensions acquired by evidentials in specific communicative contexts. Such studies have also provided better insights into the pragmatic features involved in the use of evidentials. Hanks (2012: 172) summarizes three pragmatic dimensions that affect the use of evidentials: *source of knowledge*, i.e. the source on which the information rests; *source of statement*, i.e. the source of the utterance provided; and *expressivity/interaction force*, i.e. the "subjective relation between the speaker and some element of the utterance context" (Hanks 2012: 174). The first and third pragmatic dimensions (i.e. source of knowledge and expressivity) have been detailed in studies on evidentials, both from a typological perspective (Willett 1988; DeLancey 1997;

<sup>5</sup>Through the term "inferring" Willett indicates both inference, in Willett's terms "results", and assumption, in Willett's terms "reasoning".

Plungian 2001; Aikhenvald 2004) and in language specific descriptions (Curnow 2002, 2003; Clift 2006; Babel 2009), but the second pragmatic dimension, *source of statement*, has received less attention in the literature. According to Hanks (2012: 174), two kinds of possible pragmatic effects belong to the *source of statement*, i.e. the *discourse modality* and the *participant roles*. *Discourse modality* refers to the perspective that speakers adopt in shaping their utterance. In this respect, Nuckolls (2012) demonstrates that, in Pastaza Quichua, the use of different evidential markers in conversational context does not necessarily indicate the access to information, but it can also specify the perspective adopted by speakers towards the information.

- (11) Pastaza Quichua (Quechua languages, Ecuador y Perú; Nuckolls 2012: 231; gloss modified)
- a. *Ñuka-ta ña kai ruya-ta rikwi-i chi s<sup>h</sup>api-mi siri-u-n.*  
 I-ACC now this tree-ACC look-IMP that base-EV lie-DUR-3SG  
 ‘Look at me (up in) this tree! It’s lying right at that base!’ (Context: The speaking self of the narrative event (-mi s<sup>n</sup>) where Luisa becomes the voice of Tito talking to his friend)
- b. *Ni-sha-shi kapari-ni.*  
 say-COR-EVD shout-1SG  
 ‘Saying (according to my husband) I shout.’ (Context: The voice of the other (-shi), where Luisa specifies the perspective of Tito who was asserting something to her)

In examples (11a) and (11b), the use of two markers, i.e. the direct evidential *-mi* and the reported evidential *-shi*, does not signal a difference in the way Luisa has gained access to information. Since in both cases Luisa heard Tito’s words, it rather points out the two different perspectives from which Luisa is providing the information. In (11a), by using the evidential marker *-mi*, she provides information from Tito’s perspective who *de facto* pronounced the words that she is reporting. In (11b), on the other hand, by using the evidential marker *-shi*, Luisa maintains her perspective and distances herself from Tito’s words.

The change of perspective implied by the use of different evidentials, as shown for Pastaza Quichua, is essential to clarify the relevance of the second class of pragmatic effects established by Hanks (2012), i.e. *participant roles*. Drawing on Goffman’s (1981) classification, speakers can be said to occupy three roles, namely, *principal*, *author* and *animator*. The *principal* is the one responsible for the utterance, i.e. the last person who committed to the information provided.

The *author* is the person who has chosen the words of the utterance in the narrated world (Goffman 1981), i.e. who has pronounced it for the first time. Finally, the *animator* is the person who physically produces the utterance. The three roles generally overlap within the same speaker, e.g. in the sentence “I am fine”, the speaker is *principal* since s/he is taking responsibility for his/her own emotional and health status, as well as *author* and *animator* since s/he chooses the words of the statement and physically utters them.

Further elements of the description of the pragmatic features involved in the use of evidentials are provided by Kockelman (1957) and Bergqvist (2018). Kockelman (1957) proposes an implementation of Jakobson’s (1957) classification of event types by adding a *commitment event*, and by expanding the *narrated speech event* to apply to all evidential notions, calling it *source event*. The resulting set of event types is composed by the *speech event*, the *narrated event*, the *source event* and the *commitment event*. The *speech event* corresponds to the world in which the utterance is made. The *source event* corresponds to the “spoken-about world in which speaking occurs” (Kockelman 1957: 128), and may be distinguished according to the type of contact that a speaker has with a source (Kockelman 1957: 143). The *narrated event* indicates the world described in the utterance. Finally, the *commitment event* is the world where the speaker commits to the truth of the proposition expressed (Kockelman 1957: 127). In addition to this proposal, Kockelman (1957) also establishes a correlation between Goffman’s (1981) participant roles, i.e. *animator*, *author* and *principal*, and the new set of event types, i.e. the *speech event*, the *narrated event* and the *commitment event*. Within this framework, Bergqvist (2018) formulates another relation that connects *source event* (Kockelman 1957: 128) with a new participant role defined as *cognizer* (Bergqvist 2018: 22), i.e. the person who perceives the event. This set of correspondences is illustrated in 8.1.

Table 8.1: Correspondence between event types and participant roles

| Event Type       |   | Speaker Role |
|------------------|---|--------------|
| speech event     | ↔ | animator     |
| source event     | ↔ | cognizer     |
| narrated event   | ↔ | author       |
| commitment event | ↔ | principal    |

If one takes the model of correspondences shown in 8.1, and applies this to Example (11), above, it becomes possible to provide an analysis of the pragmatic



features relevant to the use of evidentials. In (11a), Luisa produces the utterance as if Tito was pronouncing it. This strategy results in two series of consequences in the configuration of the correlation between event types and participant roles: first, by reproducing Tito's voice, Luisa creates an artificial overlap between the participant roles of the two speakers, playing simultaneously the *animator* (Luisa is indeed the last who pronounced the utterance), the *author* (Tito has chosen the words of the information), the *cognizer* (Tito witnessed the event) and the *principal* (Tito committed to the truth of his statement); second, by impersonating Tito's voice, Luisa fictitiously matches the world in which she is pronouncing the utterance with the world in which Tito pronounced the utterance, i.e. the *speech event* overlaps with the *source event*, since they fictitiously occur in the same world. Given the use of the direct evidential *-mi*, the *commitment event* coincides with the *source event*. Finally, considering that the *narrated event* does not make any reference to the world in which the *speech event* occurs (e.g. in "I promise"), it will be kept separate from the others. In (11b), the configuration of event types and participant roles is different. By using the reported evidential *-shi*, instead, Luisa specifies the separation between the *speech event* and the *source event*, the *narrated event* is kept distinguished from the previous two event types and, finally, the configuration of the *commitment event*, as for the correlated participant role, cannot be established.

### 3 Material, participants and method

Thirty Spanish-Aymara bilingual speakers participated in the study (17 males and 13 females, age range: 18–64). All participants first learned Aymara and then acquired Spanish during their childhood. The L2 proficiency in the standard variety of La Paz Spanish varied among the speakers depending on age and level of education. About 60% of the speakers had university level education, 26,6% had secondary education and 13,4% had primary education.

The data was collected mainly in La Paz and El Alto (Bolivia). The corpus consists of fully transcribed recordings lasting 8 hours and 24 minutes in total. The transcription convention employed (Briz & Universidad de Valencia 2000) has also been used for the transcription of colloquial Spanish corpora and allows for a faithful representation of speech.

The corpus is divided into three parts: the first and largest part consists of the recordings of the "Family Problems Picture Task" (San Roque et al. 2012), the second part consists of five recordings of the task "The Pear Story" (Chafe 1980), and the third part consists of four recordings of personal narratives.

The “Family Problems Picture Task” (FPPT) was created to activate the use of cognitive categories such as evidentiality and mirativity (San Roque et al. 2012: 140). Its two-fold nature of problem-solving and interactive task allows the activation of inferential processes and, therefore, supports the analysis of the use of evidentials in interactive settings. The task consists of 16 pictures in black and white that follow a defined order. The temporal sequence and content of the pictures are not always clear. Inferential processes are required to understand the order and development of the story.

The FPPT was developed in five steps: in the first step, speakers were asked to describe five of the sixteen pictures randomly selected by the fieldworker; in the second step, speakers ordered all the pictures according to the story that they believed it was represented; in the third step, one of the two participants in the first two steps was asked to describe the story built in the first person singular; in the fourth step, the other participant was asked to tell the story in the third singular person to a third person who did not participate in the task until then; finally, during the fifth step, the third participant was asked to tell the story s/he had been told. In order to facilitate data analysis, the internal organization of the transcriptions follows the same structure of the FPPT, i.e. each transcription is divided into five parts.

## **4 The epistemic-evidential functions of the PPI**

The corpus features 78 tokens of the PPI. The analysis reveals that in most of the cases, 68%, the PPI is used according to its temporal function (see example 5), i.e. it indicates the temporal relation between two past actions; nevertheless, in a significant number of cases, 32%, the PPI seems to operate as an epistemic-evidential form, i.e. it specifies the epistemic relation between the speaker and the event. When the PPI is used as an epistemic-evidential form, it may display inferential evidence, reported evidence or mirativity. As an inferential evidential, the PPI signals inference based on observable evidence (13 cases). As a reported evidential, it signals second-hand report, i.e. the speaker has directly heard the words of someone else (9 cases). Finally, as mirative form, it indicates surprise (2 cases). Table 8.2 summarizes this.

In the corpus, over 90% of the occurrences of the PPI (72 cases out of 78) comes from the transcriptions of the FPPT; the remaining cases come from the transcriptions of the personal narratives. By analyzing the distribution of these 72 cases among the steps of the FPPT, it turns out that the PPI appears 8 times during the first step, 5 times during the second step, 24 times during the third step, 22 times

Table 8.2: Function of the PPI in the data

| Function                      | Nº of cases |
|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Temporal function             | 54          |
| Mirative function             | 2           |
| Inferring results function    | 13          |
| Reported second-hand function | 9           |
| Total                         | 78          |

during the fourth step, and 13 times during the fifth step. By further narrowing down this analysis to the cases in which the PPI seems to operate as an epistemic-evidential forms, it is notable that all cases of PPI with evidential-epistemic functions occur within the transcriptions of the FPPT. Secondly, no case of inferences based on observable results occurs in the third (i.e. narrative in the first person) and the fifth step of the task (i.e. report of the story to a third participant). Lastly, the largest number of cases of the second-hand reported function appears in the fifth step. This distribution is presented in Table 8.3.

Table 8.3: Evidential functions of the PPI (columns) for the steps of the FPPT (rows)

| FPPT         | Inferring results evidence | Second-hand reported evidence | Mirativity | Total |
|--------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|------------|-------|
| Step I       | 2                          | 1                             | 2          | 5     |
| Step II      | 3                          | -                             | -          | 3     |
| Step III     | -                          | 1                             | -          | 1     |
| Step IV      | 8                          | -                             | -          | 8     |
| Step V       | -                          | 7                             | -          | 7     |
| <b>Total</b> | 13                         | 9                             | 2          | 24    |

#### 4.1 Mirative or inferential function?

The debate on the relation between evidentiality and mirativity is still an open one. On the one hand, some scholars discuss the nature of the relation between the two domains: DeLancey (1997) and Aikhenvald (2004) consider them as separate, while Lazard (1999) and de Haan (2012) consider them to be related. On the

other hand, recent studies (Hill 2012) entirely reject the description of mirativity as an independent category, arguing that direct evidence (“sensory evidence” in Hill’s terms) is an adequate category to account for most of the markers described as miratives in the literature.

Taking into account cases in which the use of the PPI is related to the expression of a direct, visual contact with the discourse object, the data shows three situations: (i) the PPI can simultaneously signal both an inferential and a mirative function (example 12), (ii) the PPI can signal only inference (example 13) and, (iii) the PPI can signal only mirativity (example 14).

In a few cases, it is not possible to establish a clear distinction, or a hierarchy between the inferential (Willett 1988) and the mirative function of the PPI; the two functions, indeed, seem to co-exist and overlap within the same form, i.e. the PPI [cf. 12].

(12) La Paz Spanish (5\_SP\_TASK: 6)

- a. *El mismo es.*  
the same be.PRS.3SG  
‘It is the same.’
- b. *El mismo con su mujer.*  
the same with 3.POS woman  
‘The same with his wife.’
- c. ...  
...  
...
- d. *aaaa hab-ía sido agricultor el cuate*  
INTERJ have-PST.IPFV.3SG be.PTCP farmer the guy  
‘Aaaa he is (lit. had been) a farmer, the guy’
- e. *est-án cosech-ando no*  
be-PRS.3PL harvest-GER NO  
‘They are harvesting, aren’t they?’
- f. *est-án cosech-ando sí el campo es*  
be-PRS.3PL harvest-GER yes the countryside be.PRS.3SG  
‘They are harvesting, yes, it is in the countryside’

In (12), the speakers are describing picture (e) in Figure 8.1, which is the fifth image shown to participants during the first step of the FPPT, showing a man and a woman that are picking pumpkins in a garden. The remaining four pictures, previously shown to the participants during this stage of the task, depict the man




Figure 8.1: Pictures used during the first step of FPPT

in a cell (picture 8.1a), drinking alcohol (picture 8.1b), hitting his wife (picture 8.1c), and standing in a courtroom (picture 8.1d).

From observing the first four pictures, speakers are not expected to be able to guess the man's profession. Picture 8.1e appears to present new and partly surprising information, indicated by rising intonation and the interjection "aaa" (see Example 12, above). Although a mirative function is implied by this specific use of the PPI, it is clear that an ongoing inferential process is at the foundation of the information provided. There is no doubt, that in (12) the sentence where the PPI occurs is an inference, given the fact that no pictures in the task clearly show that the man's profession is farming. A further instance of this evidential function of the PPI is found in (13).

(13) La Paz Spanish (3\_SP\_TASK: 11–12)

- a. *aquí qué est-á hac-iendo este señor ya le*  
 here what be-PRS.3SG do-GER this man already 3SG.DAT  
*empiez-a a cont-ar ha deb-ido est-ar lejos*  
 start.PRS.3SG to tell-INF have.PRS.3SG must-PTCP be-INF far.away  
*trabaj-ando este señor tal vez le empiez-a a cont-ar su*  
 work-GER this man maybe 3SG.DAT start-PRS.3SG to tell-INF 3.POS  
*señora a su hijo todo el suceso como hac-ía como*  
 wife to 3.POS son all the happening how do-PST.IPFV.3SG how  
*trabaj-aba no*  
 work-PST.IPFV.3SG no  
 ‘Here, what is this man doing? Aaa now he starts to tell. He must be far away, this man, maybe. He starts to tell his wife and his son everything happened. How he did, how he worked, no?’
- b. *y su esposa escuch-a.*  
 and 3.POS wife listen-PRS.3SG  
 ‘And his wife listens’
- c. *y acá empiez-a a trabaj-ar deb-e ser al*  
 and here start-PRS.3SG to work-INF must-PRS.3SG be-INF to.ART.SG  
*día siguiente o más tarde no ambos trabaj-aban recog-en*  
 day next or more late no both work-PST.IPFV.3PL pick-PRS.3PL  
*su-s zapallo-s*  
 3POS-PL pumpkin-PL  
 ‘And here they start to work, it must be the day after or later, no? both work, they are picking pumpkins’
- d. *zapallo-s*  
 pumpkin-PL  
 ‘Pumpkins’
- e. *o sea est-as persona-s son agricultor-es*  
 that.is.INTERJ this-F.PL person-PL be.PRS.3PL farmer-PL  
 ‘That is, these people are farmers’
- f. *aquí est-án llev-ando zapallo-s*  
 here be-PRS.3PL carry-GER pumpkin-PL  
 ‘Here, they are carrying pumpkins’
- g. *es-os zapallo-s que han recog-ido llev-an a*  
 that-M.PL pumpkin-PL that have.3PL pick-PTCP carry-PRS.3PL to

*vend-er a la feria allí es con su hij-ito*  
 sell-INF to ART.F.SG market there be.PRS.3SG with 3.POS son-DIM  
*es más pequeño*  
 be.PRS.3SG more small

'Those pumpkins that they picked. They are carrying to the market.  
 There he is with his little son, he is younger' (glossed)

h. *más pequeñ-ito Yola*  
 more small-DIM Yola.PN

'Younger Yola' (glossed)

i. *hab-ía ten-ido dos hijo-s.*  
 have-PST.IPFV.3SG have-PTCP two child-PL

'He must have (lit. had had) two children' (glossed)

j. *dos hijo-s aquí est-á*  
 two child-PL here be-PRS.3SG

'two children? Here it is' (glossed)

k. *ya aquí*  
 INTERJ here

'Yes, here' (glossed)

Example (13) is an extract from the second stage of the FPPT. Here, the PPI is the main verb of the utterance *había tenido dos hijos* 's/he must have had two children'. The speakers placed the pictures of the story in the order shown in Figure 8.2.

In picture 8.2a, a man sits talking to a woman and a boy. In picture 8.2b, the same man is picking pumpkins in a garden with a woman. Finally, in picture 8.2c, the man, the woman and a small child are walking together down a road, carrying two baskets full of pumpkins. After putting in order the three pictures, the speakers imagine that the actions depicted in them are performed in a few days, *debe ser al día siguiente o más tarde* 'it must be the day after or later'. Furthermore, by comparing picture 8.2a to picture 8.2c, they cannot help but notice the presence of two children with different ages. This visually available evidence produces the inference made by B that the couple has two children (*había tenido dos hijos*).

If in the previous cases (example 12 and 13) the use of the PPI is related to an ongoing inferential process, in two cases, the PPI seems to operate exclusively as a mirative form indicating the surprise of the speaker with respect to something drawn in the pictures.




Figure 8.2: Pictures used during the second step of FPPT

- (14) La Paz Spanish (5\_SP\_TASK: 5)

*uuu qué pas-a aquí a su mujer le*  
 INTERJ what happen-PRS.3SG here to his wife 3SG.DAT  
*hab-ía peg-ado ese maricón*  
 have-PST.IPFV.3SG hit-PTCP that wimp

‘Uuu, What’s happening here? That wimp has hit (lit. had hit) his wife!’

In Example (14), taken from the first stage of the task, the speaker is describing what is drawn in picture 8.1c. The use of the PPI, in this case, does not signal an inference, nor is it possible to consider this use of the form as related to other documented uses of the PPI in Spanish such as the expression of *consecutio temporum*, politeness or habitual aspect. Given the linguistic elements that co-occur with the PPI in Example (14), i.e. the interjection “uuu”, the appellative *ese maricón* ‘that wimp’, and the exclamatory form of the utterance, the function of the PPI aligns better with the speaker’s (negative) surprise of the man hitting the woman in the picture. This use of the PPI could therefore be said to be an instance of the mirative function, also conforming to mirative uses of this tense as noticed for Argentinian Spanish (Bermúdez 2008).



## 4.2 Secondhand reported evidential function

As a reported evidential, the PPI always signals second-hand reports, meaning that the speaker reports something that s/he has heard directly from the *author* of the utterance.

According to Spanish grammars (Maldonado 1999), indirect speech is constructed through a conjugated reporting verb followed by the complementizer *que* ‘that’ and a subordinate clause, whose verb is conjugated according to specific tense agreement rules. If the reporting verb is in the present tense, then the verb of the subordinate clause will also be in the present tense, the simple past/present perfect/imperfect, or in the future tense. In the subordinate clause, the use of one tense rather than another depends on the original tense of the verb of the reported utterance.

- (15) La Paz Spanish (2\_SP\_TASK: 20), speaker A  
*uno de su-s familiar-es lo ha llev-ado prenda-s*  
 one of 3.POS-PL relative-PL 3SG.ACC have-PRS.3SG take-PTCP cloth-PL  
 ‘one of his relatives has brought him clothes’
- (16) La Paz Spanish (2\_SP\_TASK: 20), speaker B  
*dic-e que algun-os familiar-es fueron a dej-ar-le*  
 say-PRS.3SG that some-M.PL relative-PL go.PST.3PL to leave-INF-3SG.DAT  
*prenda-s*  
 cloth-PL  
 ‘He says that some relatives went to leave him clothes’

Examples (15) and (16) are from the fourth and the fifth stage of the FPPT, exemplify the change from direct to indirect speech in Spanish. In (16), speaker A is reporting to the fieldworker what speaker B told him during the previous stage of the task (15).

The data contains few examples of the PPI as a reported evidential. In such cases, the reporting verb is in present tense, as in (18).

- (17) La Paz Spanish (10\_SP\_TASK: 10), speaker C  
*Dos person-as van trabaj-ando / una pareja*  
 two person-PL go.PRS.3SG work-GER a couple  
 ‘two people are working, a couple’

- (18) La Paz Spanish (10\_SP\_TASK: 10), speaker D  
*ee bien dic-e            ¿no? un día hab-ía            hab-ido una pareja*  
well say-PRS.3SG no a day have-PST.IPFV.3SG have-PTCP a couple  
'Well he says, doesn't he? one day there was (lit. had been) a couple'

Examples (17) and (18) present a similar situation to the one already discussed for Examples (15) and (16). Example (18) is a reported representation of what said by the speaker C in (17). However, unlike Example (16), the use of the PPI in Example (18) cannot be analyzed in terms of tense agreement, which is clearly violated, but rather responds to the need of the speaker to distance her/himself from the reported utterance. This distancing is linguistically expressed by a removal in time of the reported utterance and the greater temporal distance between the verb of speaking, *dice* 's/he says', and the verb of subordinate clause, *había habido* 'had had'.

The use of two different tenses in the reported speech of (16) and (18), i.e. the simple past and the PPI, respectively, depends on the epistemic-evidential function of the PPI. In both examples, the presence of the reporting verb *decir* 'to say' makes explicit that the information provided comes from another speaker and that there is a subsequent epistemic distance between the speaker and the source of information. By using the simple past (16), the speaker B does not add any further pragmatic information to the story and presents it as a mere outcome of a report. In contrast, the PPI in example (18) creates a greater distance between the speaker and the information provided. This allows speaker D to (i) signal that the story provided is a report, and (ii) maintain her/his own perspective by specifying that what s/he is reporting does not represent her/his own words nor her/his view of the story. In other words, the use of the PPI as the main verb of the subordinate clause in (18) indicates that the speaker D does not want to commit to the story told by the speaker in example (17).

#### 4.3 Event types and participant roles in the evidential uses of the PPI

The analysis of the configuration of the pragmatic features involved in the use of the PPI as an evidential produces two separate outcomes depending on the evidential function expressed by the PPI.

When the PPI signals inference, as in Example (13), the participant roles of *animator*, *author* and *cognizer* are placed with the speaker, since s/he (i) pronounces the utterance in the real world, (ii) chooses the words of the utterance and (iii) makes the inference. The role of *principal* in Example (13), needs some further discussion, however. Despite what is generally stated in the literature on

the evidential use of the PPI (Speranza 2014), in the data from La Paz Spanish there are no clear instances in support of the hypothesis that the inferential use of the PPI encodes the speaker's low, or high commitment to the truth of the information, i.e. there are no instances of additional linguistic elements, e.g. *tal vez* "maybe" or *ciertamente* "certainly", that indicate the epistemic stance of the speaker towards the information provided. This observation aligns with what Cornillie (2009) states with respect to evidentials in Italian (examples 9 and 10) that the inferring function of the simple future in Italian is not strictly tied to the expression of commitment to the truth of information. Likewise, the inferential use of the PPI does not appear to signal degree of commitment, but rather specifies the presence of an intermediary step, i.e. a cognitive process, in the acquisition of information by the speaker. Consequently, the use of the PPI as an inferential evidential does not specify the participant role of *principal* and the form could thus be considered as epistemically neutral. With respect to the configuration of event types, in Example (13) there is a clear distinction between the *narrated event* and the *speech event*, since the action described in the utterance refers to a world that is not related to the one in which the *speech event* took place. The *source event*, instead, seems to coincide with the *speech event*; this overlap is due to the fact that the process that leads the speakers to state their inference is simultaneous to the pronunciation of the utterance. Finally, the configuration of the *commitment event* – as already mentioned for the related participant role, i.e. *principal* – does not seem to be specified in the inferential use of the form.

With regard to the evidential second-hand reported function of the PPI (Example 18), as already mentioned, the difference determined by the use of the PPI in Example (18) and the simple past in Example (16) lies in the different stance from which the speakers produce their narratives. In (16), by using the simple past, the speaker reports the story without adding an epistemic qualification. In (18), by contrast, the speaker adds epistemic information to the utterance by using the PPI. Such temporal distancing, allows the speaker to reduce her/his commitment to the truth of the proposition. Regarding the configuration of participant roles, it is relevant to notice that Examples (16) and (18) show different configurations. In (16), the role of *cognizer* coincides with the role of *animator*, while *author* remains separate and *principal* is unspecified. In (18), on the other hand, the configuration of the participant roles of *animator*, *cognizer* and *author* is the same as in (16), but the participant role of *principal* is present and coincides with that of *author*. With respect to the configuration of the event types in Examples (16) and (18), it is important to note that in reported speech, the *speech event* and the *source event* are always separated. In Examples (16) and (18) the *narrated event* is also located separately. The main distinction between the two examples, therefore, relates to the

specification of the *commitment event*. While the use of the canonical reported speech in Example (16) does not imply the speaker’s commitment, the use of the PPI in Example (18) features a low degree of commitment by the speaker. Table (8.4) summarizes the configuration of the event types discussed for the evidential function of the PPI.

Table 8.4: Event types in the evidential functions of the PPI

| Event types in inferential PPI | Event types in reported PPI      |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Speech event                   | Speech event                     |
| Source event                   | Commitment event<br>Source event |
| Narrated event                 | Narrated event                   |

## 5 Conclusions

On the basis of first-hand data from La Paz Spanish, this study details the uses of the PPI and demonstrates that in La Paz Spanish, beyond its normative uses, this tense is also used to express epistemic-evidential functions. In the existing literature on the Latin American varieties of Spanish, the PPI has been described as a tense that can serve as mirative, reported speech, and endophoric evidentials. The present paper provides new findings and demonstrates that in La Paz Spanish the PPI is also used accordingly as an inferential evidential that has been previously unnoticed. The analysis also reveals that the form can convey more than one epistemic-evidential function simultaneously, meaning that in these cases, it is actually not possible to establish a sharp distinction between the evidential function and the mirative function, since both seem to play an important role in this use of the form. It is important to note, moreover, that in the data both the mirative and the inferential uses of the PPI are strictly related to visual access of the source of information. This last statement, to a certain extent, supports Hill’s (2012) analysis of the mirative forms as markers related to sensory contact with the source event. However, given the PPI’s attested epistemic-evidential functions, it is not appropriate to consider it as a “sensory evidential” (Hill 2012), but more like the Turkish *-mİş*, i.e. an instance of a “mediative” (Lazard 1999) form.

A further consideration concerns the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition marked by an evidential. In its inferential use, the PPI does not signal the speaker's commitment to the truth of the proposition and in these cases, it only expresses inference without any further epistemic connotations. By contrast, its evidential use as a (second-hand) reportative evidential, is related to the expression of a lower commitment to the truth of the information provided. I believe that this difference is basically due to the type of contact that the speaker has with the source. In the first case, the speaker has visual contact with the source that activates an inferential process based on the speaker's own logic and interpretation; in the second case, the contact with source is mediated and the speaker is aware of telling the story that another individual has formulated and whose accuracy s/he cannot confirm.

A final consideration is related to the absence of examples of the PPI expressing other evidential functions, such as inferential reasoning, third-hand report, and folklore (see Aikhenvald 2004). This absence could depend either on the nature of the form that does not convey all the indirect evidential functions or on the nature of the materials used to elicit the evidential forms used in this study. In relation to this second possibility, I believe that two elements of the FPPT may have influenced my results: (i) the predominant role played by the visual contact in the development of the first four stages and (ii) the fifth stage producing mainly second-hand reported speech. Although these two elements do not preclude the use of the PPI with other epistemic-evidential functions in the whole corpus, they certainly favor certain uses rather than others. More studies of first-hand data are needed in order to improve our understanding of the epistemic-evidential uses of the PPI in both La Paz Spanish and other varieties of Latin American Spanish.

## Abbreviations

|     |               |        |                |
|-----|---------------|--------|----------------|
| 1   | First Person  | FPPT   | Family Problem |
| 2   | Second Person |        | Picture Task   |
| 3   | Third Person  | FUT    | Future         |
| ACC | Accusative    | GER    | Gerund         |
| ART | Article       | IMP    | Imperative     |
| CON | Conditional   | INF    | Infinitive     |
| DAT | Dative        | INTERJ | Interjection   |
| DIM | Diminutive    | IPFV   | Imperfect      |
| DUR | Durative      | M      | Masculine      |
| EVD | Evidential    | PL     | Plural         |
| F   | Feminine      | PN     | Personal Noun  |

|     |                                   |      |             |
|-----|-----------------------------------|------|-------------|
| POS | Possessive                        | PTCP | Participle  |
| PPI | <i>Preterito Pluscuamperfecto</i> | REFL | Reflexive   |
| PRS | Present                           | SG   | Singular    |
| PST | Past                              | SUBJ | Subjunctive |

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