Cinque (1988) notices that Italian impersonal *si* can be interpreted so as to include the speaker and that such a reading is actually mandatory in certain contexts. A similar conclusion holds for impersonal *man* in a language such as Swedish, with the difference that, in the relevant contexts, *man* takes on the reading of 1st person singular, hence ‘I’ and not ‘we’. In this paper, I argue that Cinque’s observation can only be understood in a theory explaining how impersonal readings (generic and existential) are restricted, rather than in a general theory of “inclusiveness”. The first part of paper is dedicated to showing how impersonal readings are restricted by the temporal and aspectual specification of the clause. This part summarizes some by now well-known facts concerning the interpretation of *man*. The second part of the paper discusses a further restriction on impersonal readings, stemming from focus and contrastiveness. The relevant effect is shown in cases of topicalization of SELF-anaphora in impersonal constructions in some Germanic languages. To my knowledge, these data have so far gone unobserved in the literature.

1 Introduction: “Inclusive” readings of impersonal pronouns

The literature on impersonal pronouns has grown considerably in the last 20 years. Its findings suggest that “impersonal syntax” is a rather heterogeneous phenomenon which extensively correlates with different parts of grammar, semantics, and pragmatics.
In this paper, I intend to discuss two well-known empirical observations. First, in seminal work on impersonal pronouns, Cinque (1988) notices that Italian impersonal *si* can be interpreted so as to include the speaker and that such a reading is actually mandatory in certain contexts. That is to say, while in (1), *si* can be interpreted as ‘we’, in (2) it has to be interpreted thus:

(1) Italian

*Si è lavorato per due mesi per risolvere il problema.*

*a. ‘People have worked for two months to solve the problem.’

b. ‘We have worked for two months to solve the problem.’

Second, Kratzer (1997; 2000) makes the observation the German impersonal *man* is understood to include the speaker in cases such as (3) and (4):

(3) German

*Als ich klein war, wurde man nur am Freitag gebadet.*

*‘When I was little, we only had a bath on Fridays.’*

(4) German

*Wenn ich Kinder hätte, könnte man zusammen Monopoly spielen.*

*‘If I had children, we could play Monopoly together.’*

In the following pages, I will refer to (1–2) as “Cinque’s observation”, and to (3–4) as “Kratzer’s observation”. The question arises as to whether the speaker-inclusion-effects observed in (1–4) have a common underlying source. In other words, should we try to formulate a general theory of “inclusiveness” that can account for all of (1–4)? Some such suggestions have been advanced and discussed in the literature (different views are being expressed in e.g. D’Alessandro & Alexiadou 2003; D’Alessandro 2007; Malamud 2006; Zobel 2011). In this paper, however, I argue that a unified account of (1–4) is implausible.

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There is some regional and dialectal variation concerning the b-reading of (1) and the acceptability of (2). My Italian consultants are speakers of the Tuscan variety.
In fact, the two observations are essentially different in nature: An adequate account of Kratzer’s observation should explain why, in certain contexts, an impersonal pronoun must be interpreted so as to include the speaker. An account of Cinque’s observation, on the other hand, should explain why, in certain contexts, an impersonal pronoun cannot be interpreted either as generic or as existential.2

The paper is organized as follows: In §2, I list some arguments against a unified approach to (1–4), after which Kratzer’s observation is set aside: I assume that Kratzer’s claim is correct and, hence, that (3–4) can be successfully accounted for in a theory of logophoricity (as further developed in Kratzer 2009). In §3, I claim that important restrictions on impersonal readings derive from the (interaction between) lexical and grammatical aspect. In §4, I turn to the topicalization of the equivalents of self in some Germanic languages. In self-topicalization environments, a different restriction on impersonal readings emerges, deriving from the information structural notion of contrastiveness.

2 Against a unified approach to “inclusiveness” phenomena

There are several arguments against a unified account of (1–4). Four of them will be listed in §2.1 – §2.4.

2.1 Inclusive readings vs. specific ones

In Italian (1-2) and German (3-4) alike, impersonal pronouns receive a we-reading, but there are languages in which the interpretation differs between the two cases. In Swedish (5), equivalent to Kratzer’s example (3), man is interpreted as ‘we’, quite as much as its German counterpart. However, in (6), the equivalent to (2), the reading is 1st singular, ‘I’:

(5) Swedish

\[ \text{När jag var liten badade man bara på fredagar.} \]
when I was little bathed man only on Fridays

‘When I was little, we only had a bath on Fridays.’

---

2In this paper, the readings of impersonal subjects will be defined as generic or existential (corresponding to generic and episodic time/aspect reference). For present purposes, I will avoid the term “arbitrary” which has frequently been used in the relevant literature.
I går blev man avskedad.
‘yesterday afternoon I was fired’

Hence, the conclusion that impersonal pronouns in a context such as (2) include the speaker cannot be generalized to Swedish (6), in which the subject does not include, but is specifically identified with the speaker.\(^3\)

### 2.2 The general availability of the 1st singular reading

While Kratzer’s inclusiveness effect manifests itself in particular contexts, the 1\(^{st}\) singular reading of Swedish *man* is a generally available option. That is to say, *man* can be interpreted as ‘I’ in virtually any context (although of course the scene setting can make such a reading far-fetched). Thus, an example such as (7) can have at least two interpretations: *People in Spain are in the habit of having dinner late* or *when I’m in Spain, I usually have dinner late*.

(7) Swedish

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{I Spanien äter man middag sent.} \\
\text{In Spain eats MAN dinner late}
\end{align*}
\]

a. ‘In Spain people have dinner late’
b. ‘In Spain I have dinner late’

The same holds true for Italian *si* in the relevant varieties. The example (8) has two readings parallel to the Swedish ones, but with the difference that the b-reading corresponds to 1\(^{st}\) plural: *When we’re in Spain, we usually have dinner late*.

(8) Italian

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{In Spagna si mangia tardi.} \\
\text{In Spain si eats late}
\end{align*}
\]

a. ‘In Spain people have dinner late’
b. ‘In Spain we have dinner late’

\(^3\)Traditionally, the 1\(^{st}\) singular usage of *man* has been considered substandard and not all speakers are inclined to accept it. Similar considerations hold true for specific readings of impersonal pronouns in several other languages, including the 1\(^{st}\) singular reading of Icelandic *maður* (to which I turn in §4), as well as the 1\(^{st}\) plural reading of French *on* and Italian *si*: Such interpretations are sometimes associated with dialectal/substandard registers and, therefore, are often stigmatized by prescriptive grammars.
This state of affairs shows that both Swedish man in its 1st singular reading, and Italian si in its 1st plural reading, can be under the scope of a generic operator (Chierchia 1995). This, in turn, suggests that such readings are lexicalized options. I will come back to this intuition shortly.

2.3 The sensitivity to aspect

The 1st singular interpretation of Swedish man becomes mandatory as a result of the interaction of lexical and grammatical aspect (Egerland 2003b,a). This effect manifests itself in a way which is perfectly parallel to Italian as illustrated in (1–2).

First, consider the generic contexts of (9–10):

(9) Swedish

*Man arbetat för mycket nuförtiden.*

MAN works too much nowadays

‘People/I have work too much nowadays.’

(10) Swedish

*Man blir lätt avskedad nuförtiden.*

MAN is easily fired nowadays

‘People/I get fired easily nowadays.’

Let us concentrate on the impersonal reading, setting aside the 1st singular one: In (9–10), the impersonal argument man is interpreted generically. Man can successfully be raised to subject position, say [Spec, T], regardless of whether it originates as an external argument, as in (9), or as an internal argument, as in (10). The derivations of generic man can be illustrated with the structure in (11):

(11) \[ \ldots [TP \text{ man } [T \text{ T\text{GENERIC} [VP (man) [V (man) ]]]}]] \]

Then, consider the episodic contexts of the examples (12–13):

(12) Swedish

*Man har arbetat i två månader för att lösa problemet.*

MAN has worked in two months for to solve problem the

‘People/I have been working for two months to solve the problem’
Verner Egerland

(13) Swedish
    I går blev man avskedad.
    yesterday was MAN fired
    ‘yesterday *people were / I was fired.’

In both of (12) and (13), a generic reading of man is excluded because of the
perfective grammatical aspect. However, in (12), man can be interpreted exist-
tentially, as ‘some (group of) people’, whereas in (13), the existential reading too
is barred. The derivation of existential man can be illustrated with the structure
in (14):

(14) ... [TP man [T' TEPISODIC [VP man] [V' V (man)]]]

In all of these examples, however, man can be interpreted as 1st singular, and
this reading actually becomes mandatory in (13). While the generic reading of
both (12) and (13) is ruled out by the grammatical aspect, it remains to be estab-
lished what rules out the existential reading of (13). I turn to this issue in §3.

On the contrary, inclusiveness in Kratzer’s theory does not obey any restric-
tion concerning aspect.

2.4 Cross-linguistic variation

Cinque’s effect is subject to intricate cross-linguistic variation, also among closely
related varieties. While Italian si is generally available with the we-reading,
no such reading is generally associated with Spanish se. In Spanish (15), the
only available reading is that in which some people have been working for two
months, whereas (16) is unacceptable:

(15) Spanish
    Se ha trabajado durante dos meses para resolver el problema.
    se has worked for two months to solve the problem
    ‘people have worked for two months…’

\footnote{That the crucial notion is grammatical aspect rather than specific time
reference was also pointed out by D’Alessandro & Alexiadou (2003).}

\footnote{In fact, the examples offered by Kratzer are typically generic or habitual, as in (3–4), a
fact which further underlines the difference between Kratzer’s observation and Cinque’s
observation.}
7 First Person Readings of MAN

(16) Spanish
   * Ayer se fue despedido.
      yesterday se was fired.

The variation among Germanic languages is parallel to that between Italian and Spanish. For instance, consider Norwegian and German. In contrast to Swedish, the 1st singular reading of impersonal man is not generally available in either of Norwegian or German. That is to say, in (17) and (18), man is existentially interpreted as ‘(some) people’, while (19–20) are found unacceptable by my consultants.6

(17) Norwegian
   Man har arbeidet i to måneder med dette problemet.
      man has worked in two months with this problem.the

(18) German
   Man hat zwei Monate lang gearbeitet, um das Problem zu lösen.
      man has two months long worked for the problem to solve
   ‘(Some) people have been working for two months to solve the problem.’

(19) Norwegian
   * I går ble man oppsagt.
      yesterday was man fired

(20) German
   * Gestern wurde man gefeuert.
      yesterday was man fired

Kratzer’s observation, on the other hand, is not expected to be subject to such cross-linguistic variation. Rather, some basic properties of logophoric reference are expected to be largely constant across languages.

For the purposes of this paper, I assume that Kratzer’s logophoricity account for cases of inclusiveness such as (3–4) is correct, and will not further discuss it here. In §3, I turn to the analysis of Cinque’s observation.

6This is not to say that 1st singular or 1st plural readings are all together excluded with Norwegian and German man, nor with Spanish se. In fact, impersonal readings in all of these languages can be contextually “manipulated” so as to refer to various discourse participants. However, in Norwegian, German, and Spanish, such readings are not generally available, unlike what we see in Swedish and Italian. Recall, however, that in all of these languages, such specific readings emerge as a matter of dialectal variation (see f.n. 3). Therefore, this should not necessarily be understood as a comparison between national “standard” languages, but rather between different varieties of such languages. As for a discussion on the variation within Germanic, see e.g. Malamud (2006); Hoekstra (2010).
3 The aspectual restrictions on impersonal readings

As argued in Egerland 2003b; 2005, Cinque’s observation, as well as some of the cross-linguistic variation, can be accounted for on the set of assumptions listed in §3.1 – §3.3

3.1 The 1st person reading is lexical

The man pronoun in (the relevant variety of) Swedish can be lexically associated with a 1st singular reading. By this, I mean that 1st singular man is an independent lexeme acquired as such and, hence, a homonym to impersonal man. I propose the same analysis of the 1st plural reading of (the relevant variety of) Italian si. Therefore, such readings are not syntactically constrained but, essentially, always available. For instance, such lexicalized forms can be under the scope of a generic operator, as in (7b) and (8b).

3.2 Impersonal pronouns are featurally deficient

As we have seen, there are environments in which generic as well as existential readings of man are excluded. Suppose that the ungrammaticality of Spanish (16), Norwegian (19), and German (20) arises as a result of the interaction between lexical and grammatical aspect: While a generic reading is barred by perfective aspect, the existential reading is barred by a “delimited” lexical aspect, in the sense of Tenny (1987); i.e. the existential reading is excluded by the fact that the surface subject is the internal argument of a delimited event. The generalizations expressed in the structures (11) and (14) can be captured as in (21) (a reformulation of Egerland (2003a: 82):

(21) Man cannot be the impersonal existential subject of a delimited event, if man itself corresponds to the argument that limits the event.

There is a natural explanation to (21) on the assumption that, in order to establish whether an argument does or does not limit the event, the argument in question needs to have some inherent content or, informally speaking, a certain degree of referentiality. To be more precise, suppose that a feature corresponding to the Inner Aspect projects a phrase, say EventP (Travis 2000; Borer 2005):

(22) [.TP [.vP [.DP [.v [.EventP [.Event [.VP [.v [.DP]]]]]]]]

In (22), the internal argument, but not the external one, needs to be matched against the Event. In order to enter into such a relation, the internal argument
must carry some specification with regard to specificity and number. As impersonal man is underspecified for specificity and number, it is unable to evaluate the Event. The generalization in (21) follows. Therefore, Swedish man is interpreted as 1st singular, and Italian si as 1st plural, because these are the only remaining options.

3.3 The mandatory 1st person reading is a ’last resort’

If an impersonal pronoun, in a given language, is not lexically associated with such specific readings, and if the context rules out generic and existential readings, the expression is not interpretable. This is what we observe with Spanish se (16), Norwegian man (19) and German man (20).

The intuition behind such an account is that Cinque’s observation does not follow from an effect imposing inclusive readings on impersonal pronouns, but rather from independent restrictions on generic and existential readings of such pronouns.

The discussion of this section has taken into consideration restrictions that are aspectual in nature. Clearly, however, generic and existential readings can be restricted by other factors than aspect. In the following section, I turn to a quite different set of data which I believe corroborate the approach outlined in §3.1–§3.3

4 SELF-topicalization

In this section, the hypothesis outlined in §3 will be tested on a different set of data. The following discussion, which concerns information structure, will be limited to the comparison of four Germanic varieties, namely Swedish, Icelandic, Norwegian, and German.

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7 Recall that, for instance, the difference between the delimited reading of Dustin ate an apple and the non-delimited reading of Dustin ate apples depends on the number specification of the object (Carlson 1977, Tenny 1987: 113).

8 I assume that, in the case of generic man as in the structure (11), the semantic content of man is provided by the generic operator (Chierchia 1995). Presumably, it is the presence of such an operator that makes it possible for generic man to bind anaphors, while existential man does not have this property, as pointed out by Cabredo Hofherr (2010).

9 The hypothesis cannot be tested on Romance data, given that the equivalent elements (French même, Italian stesso, Spanish mismo) cannot be topicalized in a way similar to what we observe in Germanic languages.
4.1 The topicalization of self-anaphora

In all of these languages, self anaphora can appear in different positions of the clause. Given a setting such as the one stated as Context A, as in (23–26), self can appear in a sentence internal position, the exact nature of which is immaterial for the present discussion:\(^{10}\)

**Context A:** The coming week everyone in my office is taking a leave...

(23) Swedish

\textit{Chefen äker själv på semester.}

boss.the goes self on holiday

(24) Icelandic

\textit{Stjórninn fer sjálfur í fri.}

boss.the goes self on holiday

(25) Norwegian

\textit{Sjefen drar sjøl på ferie.}

boss.the goes self on holiday

(26) German

\textit{Der Chef fährt selbst in Urlaub.}

the boss goes self on holiday

‘...the boss himself / even the boss / the boss too is going on a holiday.’

Furthermore, in all four languages, self can be topicalized, as in (27–30). This, however, is pragmatically appropriate in a different kind of setting, as for instance the one suggested in Context B:

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\(^{10}\)In all of the languages, self can appear in other possible positions as well which will not be considered here. For instance, it can follow the DP (Swedish \textit{chefen själv} ‘the boss himself’) or even appear sentence-finally. This state of affairs can be taken as evidence that self anaphora such as those discussed in the text have “floating” properties (Kayne 1975; Sportiche 1988). On the other hand, an anonymous reviewer suggests that the two instances of German \textit{selbst} in (26) and (30) could be separate lexemes though homonymous. For present purposes, this possibility can remain an open issue.
7 First Person Readings of MAN

Context B: Everyone else in my office has to work over the weekend but ...

(27) Swedish
Själv åker chefen på semester.
SELF goes boss.the on holiday

(28) Icelandic
Sjálfur fer stjórin í frí.
SELF goes boss.the on holiday

(29) Norwegian
Sjøl drar sjefen på ferie.
SELF goes boss.the on holiday

(30) German
Selbst fährt der Chef in Urlaub.
SELF goes the boss on holiday

‘... but the boss, on the other hand, is leaving for a holiday.’

Consider that, in the languages in question, SELF creates a contrastive reading. For concreteness, I chose to formulate the information structural notion of contrastiveness in terms of membership in a set, along the lines of e.g. Vilkuna & Vilkuna (1998).11

(31) (Vilkuna & Vilkuna 1998: 83)
If an expression a is kontrastive, a membership set \( M = \{..., a, ...\} \) is generated and becomes available to semantic computation as some sort of quantificational domain ...

In all of (23–30), SELF generates a set reading and picks out one member of the set, the boss: In (23–26), the expression points out that the boss is (unexpectedly) part of the set (while he could have stayed at work, he is leaving together with the others). In (27–30), on the contrary, the boss is interpreted in contrast to the other members of the set (he is leaving while everyone else is staying at work). Now, let us turn to impersonal constructions.

11 Contrastiveness, as in the definition in (31), is presented as a “cover term for several operator-like interpretations of focus that one finds in the literature” (Vilkuna & Vilkuna 1998: 83). That is to say that the generalization we are interested in could be formulated in different terms, as for instance the identificational focus of É. Kiss (1998). For present purposes, (31) will suffice.
4.2 The relevance of self-topicalization for the interpretation of impersonal man

The reason why Icelandic is taken into consideration at this point is that Icelandic maður shares with Swedish man the property of being interpretable as 1st singular in a colloquial register. For Icelandic, the effect was first discussed by Jónsson (1992) who gives the example (32) (= his 43): 12

(32) Icelandic

_Eg vona að maður verði ekki of seinn._

I hope that maður will be not too late

‘I hope I won’t be late.’

Given Context A, when self appears in the sentence internal position, there are two possible readings as illustrated in Swedish (33) and Icelandic (34):

**Context A:** In hostels there is sometimes no room cleaning service, so...

(33) Swedish

_Man måste själv städa rummet._

MAN must SELF clean room.the

(34) Icelandic

_Maður verður sjálfur að þrífa herbergið._

MAN must SELF to clean room.the

a. ‘People have to clean their rooms themselves / on their own.’
b. ‘I have to clean the room myself / on my own.’

In the a-interpretation of (33–34), the impersonal is referring to people in general. In the b-interpretation (which is colloquial), man and maður specifically refer to 1st singular. In other words, (33–34) can be taken to mean that whenever I stay in a hostel, I need to clean my room myself.

In Norwegian and German, the same sentence is acceptable in the same kind of context, however only with the generic reading:

---

12There are, however, independent differences between Swedish and Icelandic. In particular, unlike Swedish man, Icelandic maður is not compatible with the existential reading at all in episodic contexts (Jónsson 1992; Egerland 2003b; Sigurðsson & Egerland 2009). This difference need not concern us here.
(35) Norwegian
*Man må sjøl rydde rommet.*
MAN must SELF clean room.the

(36) German
*Man muss das Zimmer selbst aufräumen.*
MAN must the room SELF clean

‘People have to clean their rooms themselves.’

Thus, (35–36) confirm the earlier observation concerning Norwegian and German: Impersonal man is not associated with the 1st singular reading.  

Furthermore, under particular circumstances, self can be topicalized in both Swedish and Icelandic impersonal sentences. Such a topicalization, however, requires a completely different kind of setting to be pragmatically appropriate. For instance, a child who is grounded while his/her companions are out playing could say something such as (37–38):

**Context B:** All the other kids are out having fun, but ...

(37) Swedish
*Själv måste man städa rummet.*
SELF must MAN clean room.the

(38) Icelandic
*sjalfur verður maður að þrífa herbergið.*
SELF must MAN to clean room.the

‘... but I have to stay at home and clean my room.’

The utterance is only acceptable if the subject is identified with 1st singular. I suggest this is so because of the contrastive reading associated with topicalization. Suppose that contrastiveness indeed generates a set reading, as stated in (31). In (31), ”M is a set of objects matching a in semantic type” (Vilkuna & Vilkuna 1998: 84). Arguably, then, contrastiveness can hold between specific individuals or groups of individuals. An impersonal pronoun radically lacks specificity and

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13But recall that it is always the case with generic readings that they encompass all the persons of the paradigm, hence also 1st person.
number features. Hence, it cannot be put in contrast with another “object of the same semantic type”, quite as much as it cannot delimit the event (see §3).14

I believe this restriction on impersonal readings may be illustrated with what is sometimes called generic nouns, such as English people (and equivalent expressions in other languages), although an in depth analysis of such nouns goes far beyond the purposes of this study.15 Consider that people cannot be contrasted with a single individual. I can say something like people around here usually come early to the office, but John doesn’t, but I cannot express this meaning as a contrastive focus:

(39) ??It is people who come early to the office (not John).

Under contrastive focus, namely, people becomes a kind-denoting expression, as in (40–41) (cf. Chierchia 1998):

(40) It is people who do bad things (not God).
(41) Around here, it is people who do the work (not machines).

However, unlike impersonal pronouns, people is indeed a noun and thus compatible with a lexical restriction, such as a relative clause. Not unexpectedly, a contrastive reading with a non kind-denoting people becomes possible if people is restricted so as to refer to a specific group of individuals:

(42) It is people who come early to the office who get things done (not John).

Impersonal subjects such as man are weak pronominal elements: they cannot take restrictions such as the relative clause in (42), neither can they carry stress.16 Hence, the impersonal pronoun itself cannot be topicalized. However, the associate self is generally stressed and can indeed be topicalized.

For concreteness, then, assume that the complex [man self] originates as a phrase, and that self moves out of this phrase during the derivation. The details of such an analysis are not crucial for my line of reasoning, the important thing being that some interpretative dependency holds between the pronoun man and the anaphor self. The derivation of (37) is illustrated in the structure of (43):

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14The radical featural deficiency of impersonal pronouns such as man is also assumed in e.g. Cabredo Hofherr (2010). In Egerland (2003b) this featural deficiency was taken to be directly linked to a certain variability in agreement patterns attested in Swedish. Admittedly, this conclusion may not extend to Germanic languages generally, as pointed out in Malamud (2012).
15But in the theory of Hoekstra (2010), impersonal pronouns are taken to be the pronominal counterparts of such generic nouns.
16There are exceptions to this rule, such as West Frisian men (Hoekstra 2010).
The topicalization creates a reading in which the subject, [MAN SELF], is interpreted in contrast to some other participant of the discourse. As a deficient pronoun cannot be interpreted under contrastive focus, the lexicalized 1st singular option is the only one remaining. Therefore, (37–38) can only be taken to refer to the 1st singular.

Crucially, this line of reasoning gives rise to the prediction that the equivalent sentences are unacceptable in Norwegian and German, given that the 1st singular alternative is not available in these languages. My consultants confirm this prediction:

Norwegian

* sjøl må man rydde rommet.
  SELF must MAN clean room.the

German

* selbst muss man das Zimmer aufräumen.
  SELF must MAN the room clean

What we observe in (44–45) is the same kind of effect as in the examples (19) and (20) in §2.4: When the impersonal readings are barred, Norwegian and German cannot recur to a lexicalized specific interpretation.\(^{17}\)

5 Conclusion

While Kratzer’s observation presumably can be successfully analyzed within a theory explaining when a given impersonal must be interpreted as including the speaker, Cinque’s observation can only be understood in a theory explaining how impersonal readings are restricted. When they are, some languages can access lexicalized readings of impersonals, such as the 1st singular reading of Swedish man, while other languages do not have any such alternative. I conclude from this that Kratzer’s observation and Cinque’s observation are fundamentally different in nature, despite the superficial similarities.

\(^{17}\) An anonymous reviewer points out the (s)he finds an example such as (44) acceptable in Norwegian, quite unlike my consultants. My only suggestion as to why this could be the case, is that self in some Scandinavian varieties can take on the meaning of ‘alone’. In fact, Swedish (37) is also interpretable as ‘I have to clean the room alone’, a possibility which I have chosen to disregard. However, this meaning of self is usually taken to be more normal in Swedish than in Norwegian.

References


